Trade Facilitation Measures under Free Trade Agreements: Are They Discriminatory against Non-Members? by Hamanaka, Shintaro et al.
Trade Facilitation Measures Under Free Trade Agreements: 
Are They Discriminatory Against Non-Members?  
Shintaro Hamanaka, Aiken Tafgar, and Dorothea Lazaro
No. 55  |   July 2010 
ADB Working Paper Series on
Regional Economic Integration Shintaro Hamanaka,+ Aiken Tafgar,++  
and Dorothea Lazaro+++
Trade Facilitation Measures Under Free Trade 
Agreements: Are They Discriminatory Against 
Non-Members?
ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration
No. 55         July 2010
The authors would like to thank Teruo Ujiie and Jayant 
Menon for their helpful comments. 
+Shintaro Hamanaka is Economist, Office of Regional 
Economic  Integration,  Asian  Development  Bank,  6 
ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City, 1550 Metro Manila, 
Philippines. Tel +63 2 632 5844, Fax +63 2 636 2342, 
shamanaka@adb.org
++Aiken  Tafgar  is  Consultant,  Office  of  Regional 
Economic  Integration,  Asian  Development  Bank,  6 
ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City, 1550 Metro Manila, 
Philippines. Tel +63 2 632 5091, Fax +63 2 636 2342, 
artafgar.consultant@adb.org
+++Dorothea Lazaro is Consultant, Office of Regional 
Economic  Integration,  Asian  Development  Bank,  6 
ADB Avenue, Mandaluyong City, 1550 Metro Manila, 






The ADB Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration focuses on topics relating to regional 
cooperation and integration in the areas of infrastructure and software, trade and investment, money and 
finance, and regional public goods. The Series is a quick-disseminating, informal publication that seeks to 
provide information, generate discussion, and elicit comments. Working papers published under this Series 








































The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and 
policies of the Asian Development Bank or its Board of Governors or the governments they represent. 
 
The Asian Development Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this publication and  
accepts  no responsibility for any consequence of their use. 
 
Use of the term ―country‖ does not imply any judgment by the authors or the Asian Development Bank as to 
the legal or other status of any territorial entity. 
 
Unless otherwise noted, $ refers to US dollars. 
 
 
© 2010 by Asian Development Bank 
July 2010 







. . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . .
 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . .
 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . . 
. . .
 
. . . . . . . 
. . . . .
 
 
Abstract  iv 
1.  Introduction  1 
2.  Discriminatory Treatment in Trade Facilitation Measures  2 
2.1  Discriminatory Treatment between Members and          
Non-Members  4 
2.2  Differentiated Treatment Across FTAs  5 
3.  Examples of Trade Facilitation Provisions in FTAs:                     
Comparing Discriminatory and Non-Discriminatory Cases  6 
3.1  Transparency  6 
3.2  Customs Procedures  8 
3.3  Exemption of Fees on Digital Products  9 
3.4  Origin Administration for Preferential Tariff Treatment  11 
3.5  Conformity Assessment of Standards  12 
4.  Policy Recommendations: Minimizing Negative Effects               
of Trade Facilitation under FTAs  14 
5.  Conclusion  17 
References  18 



























Are trade facilitation measures under free trade agreements (FTAs) discriminatory? This 
important question has yet to be sufficiently explored by the existing literature on trade 
facilitation.  Despite  the  multilateral  scope  and  non-discriminatory  objectives  of  trade 
facilitation  measures,  some  trade  facilitation  measures  under  FTAs  can  be 
discriminatory, similar to those  in preferential tariff elimination. Based on a review of 
FTAs in Asia and the Pacific, this study provides detailed empirical analysis on whether 
or not trade facilitation provisions in FTAs are exclusive to contracting FTA partners and 
how the measures can be discriminatory against non-members. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Trade facilitation has recently become a hot issue among policymakers and scholars. 
While many tariff regimes in Asia and the Pacific continue to be liberalized, traders still 
face difficulties in moving goods across borders. Supporting this view are econometric 
studies showing that trade facilitation reforms considerably increase international trade 
and that their impact on trade flows is as equally significant as tariff elimination.
1 Given 
these propositions, trade facilitation measures aside from tariff elimination are now being 
seriously discussed as a part of the multilateral and regional trade agenda.  Because 
trade  facilitation  requires  a  comprehensive  approach,  t his  paper  employs  a  broad 
definition  of  trade  facilitation ,  including  transparency,
2 customs  procedures  and 
fees,
3conformity assessment, and origin administration (Asian Development Bank [ADB] 
and  the United  Nations  Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
[ESCAP], 2009).  
 
Trade facilitation measures under a free trade agreement (FTA) are important because 
of existing substantial non-tariff barriers among FTA members. Despite the elimination of 
tariffs, goods may still not always be traded smoothly or timely between FTA members. 
Trade between FTA partners can be increased through tariff elimination complemented 
by trade facilitation measures. While multilateral institutions such as the World Customs 
Organization  (WCO)  and  the  World  Trade  Organization  (WTO)  focus  on  the 
establishment of international standards and principles o f  trade facilitation, concrete 
measures to facilitate trade are often taken or implemented at the regional and bilateral 
levels. Bilateral and regional schemes to liberalize trade usually entail cooperation in 
terms of facilitating trade flows. FTA policymakers have begun to realize the significance 
of trade facilitation and have included trade facilitation provisions in recent FTAs.
4    
 
Using comparative case analyses of 34 FTAs in Asia and the Pacific,  Bin  (2008) 
concluded that FTAs are significantly dive rse as far as trade facilitation is concerned.  
Trade facilitation provisions relating to customs procedures appear in almost all FTAs. 
While 94.1% of FTAs have provisions on technical regulation (e.g., the adoption of 
international standards) and 61.7% have transparency provisions, 14.7% cover freedom 
of transit. Wilee and Redden (2007) conducted detailed case studies on trade facilitation 
initiatives  in  major  regional  trade  facilitation  frameworks  in  Asia.   Their  empirical 
assessment  outlined  five  principle s  of  trade  facilitation  in  regional  agreements:  (i) 
compliance  with  international  agreements,  (ii)  transparency,  (iii)  simplification, 
(iv) harmonization, and (v) technical assistance.  
 
It appears that the existing literature on trade facilitation has yet  to considerably explore 
one of the most critical questions regarding FTAs: are trade facilitation measures under 
                                                  
1    For example, see Anderson and Wincoop (2004); Wilson, Mann, and Otsuki (2005); Duval and  
     Utoktham (2009).  
2    General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article X.  
3    GATT Article VIII.  
4    The  first  FTA  to  include  trade  facilitation  provisions  was  the  South  Pacific  Regional  Trade  and 
Economic Cooperation Agreement, signed in 1980.   
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FTAs discriminatory? A dominant view is that most trade facilitation measures are non-
exclusive, unless members adopt specific regional standards (Schiff and Winters, 2003; 
Maur, 2008). In a similar vein, Moise (2002) argues that the simplification of customs 
procedures at the regional level rarely has discriminatory effects. At the same time, he 
observes  that  concessionary  customs  fees  applicable  to  members  and  mutual 
recognition among members can have discriminatory elements. 
  
This study provides a detailed analysis of whether or not trade facilitation provisions in 
FTAs are discriminatory and, if so, how they can be discriminatory against non-members. 
The next section provides a framework of empirical analysis that introduces the concept 
of discriminatory trade facilitation. The third section identifies how and to what extent 
trade facilitation measures can be discriminatory by comparing examples of restrictive 
and liberal trade facilitation provisions under FTAs in Asia and the Pacific. The fourth 
section  discusses  policy  recommendations,  focusing  on  how  to  minimize  the 
discriminatory  effects  of  FTA  trade  facilitation  measures  on  non-members.  The  final 
section concludes this study.  
 
 
2.  Discriminatory Treatment in Trade Facilitation Measures 
 
Non-discrimination  is  the  fundamental  philosophy  underlying  the  international  trade 
system. This is also an important principle of trade facilitation efforts at both global and 
regional levels. For example, Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Principles on 
Trade Facilitation adopted by APEC Ministers responsible for trade in 2001 says:  
 
Rules  and  procedures relating  to trade  should  be applied  in  a  manner  that  does  not 
discriminate 
[1] between or among like products or services or economic entities in like 
circumstances. 
Illustrative Example: Charging foreign and domestic entities on an equal basis for trade 
facilitation services provided to them. 
 
 
[1] The discrimination refers to inconsistency with either the national treatment or the most-favored 
nation (MFN) principle. 
 
This APEC Principle discourages two kinds of discrimination. First is the discriminatory 
treatment  across  like  products,  which  is  in  line  with  the  WTO  framework  wherein 
discrimination  across  like  products  (Technical  Barriers  to  Trade  [TBT]  Article  2.1)  or 
products  from  regions  identical  or  of  similar  conditions  prevail  (Sanitary  and  Phyto-
Sanitary  [SPS]  Article  2.3  and  Article  5.5)  is  prohibited.  Moreover,  from  a  policy 
perspective,  comparable  treatment  across  products  that  are  substitutes  from  the 
consumers’ viewpoint, and not limited to like products, is necessary. For example, if 
sanitary standards are applied to fish but not to meat, this could raise the price of fish 
and  result  in  the  shift  of  consumption  from  fish  to  meat.
5  This  not  only  distorts 
                                                  
5   The  increase  in  the  price  of  fish  is  expected  due  to  the  compliance  costs  required  to  meet  the 
standards in importing countries. Hooker and Caswell (1999) present a framework for quantifying the 
impact of SPS measures focused on the difference in compliance costs that domestic and foreign firms 
face in meeting regulatory standards. They found that increased costs on foreign producers will raise 
prices,  reduce  total  demand,  reduce  imports,  and  increase  domestic  production  in  the  importing 
country.   




consumption patterns, but also has the potential of increasing the risk levels of food.
6 
Policymakers should carefully consider possible negative effects on other products when 
a trade facilitation measure focusing on a certain product is applied , such as standards 
harmonization.  
 
The second type of discrimination  discouraged by the APEC Principle  is the different 
treatment between domestic and foreign products and across countries, which is the 
main focus of this paper. While an FTA is an arrangement to provide preferential or 
discriminatory treatment to goods imported from one of the agreement’s members, trade 
facilitation  is  fundamentally  very  liberal  because  it  seeks  to  eliminate  unnecessary 
barriers to trade. The APEC Principle reaffirms the significance of non-discrimination in 
the field of trade facilitation in terms of both national treatment and most-favored-nation 
(MFN) status. 
 
When designing trade facilitation measures under an FTA framework, it is important for 
policymakers to consider the nature of the proposed measures, particularly whether or 
not  the  provisions  have  discriminatory  effects  on  non-members.  Even  if  the  ultimate 
objective  of  trade  facilitation  appears  to  be  multilateral  and  non-discriminatory,  some 
trade facilitation measures under an FTA could give preferential treatment akin to tariff 
elimination, especially if the benefits can be enjoyed only by FTA members, or may be 
extended  to  non-FTA  members  only  under  certain  restrictions.  The  question  here  is 
whether  goods  from  third  countries  (Country  B  or  C)  can  enjoy  the  merit  of  trade 
facilitation measures under the FTA between Country X and Country A (Figure 1). This 
is referred to as discriminatory treatment. Also, policymakers should notice that the level 
of preferential treatment rendered by a country in each FTA in which it is engaged in is 
not the same for all partners. Country X, a common partner, may render much better 
treatment in terms of trade facilitation of goods from Country A than goods from Country 
B, even if both Country A and Country B have an FTA with Country X. This is referred to 
as differentiated trade facilitation treatment. The analyses below provide a more detailed 












                                                  
6   Another example would be the case of the dispute over asbestos and non-asbestos substitute products 
in which Canada argued that the asbestos it exports was a like product to the substitute non-asbestos 
products used in France, therefore deserving no less favorable treatment under the national treatment 
obligation  of  Article  III:4  of  GATT  1994  (Ekins  and  Vanner,  2009).  The  appellate  body  considered 
consumers’ tastes and habits significant in determining ―likeness.‖ Further, the body considered the 
extent  to  which  consumers  perceive  and  treat  the  products  as  alternative  means  of  performing 
particular functions in order to satisfy a particular want or demand.  
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Discriminatory  treatment.  Only  goods 
from Country A and X can enjoy the benefit 
of  trade  facilitation  measures  under  the 
FTA  between  Country  X  and  Country  A. 
Goods  from  Country  B  and  Country  C 
cannot  enjoy  the  benefits,  or  may  do  so 
only under restrictive conditions. 
 
Differentiated  treatment.  Country  X 
renders different trade facilitation treatment 
to  goods  from  Country  A  vs.  goods  from 
Country B, even if both have an FTA with 
Country X.  
 
 






FTA = free trade agreement. 
Note: Country X has an FTA with Country A and Country B, but not with Country C.   




2.1  Discriminatory Treatment between Members and Non-Members 
 
When trade facilitation measures under an FTA are by nature non-exclusive, which is 
one of the two conditions of a public good,
7 the benefits can be enjoyed even by non-
FTA members. Such measures cannot avoid a free-rider problem because they cannot 
be  made  exclusive  from  the  beginning.  The  same  treatment  for  members  and  non-
members  is  guaranteed  by  the  non-exclusivity  of  the  measures.  This  kind  of  trade 
facilitation measures is emphasized in existing studies, which argue that most regional 
trade facilitation measures also benefit non-members.  
 
A  customs  transparency  provision  is  a  typical  example  of  a  measure  that  is  non-
exclusive by nature. An FTA requiring members to publish customs procedures (e.g., in 
print or on the internet) makes the information available to non-members too. Another 
scenario is one in which parties agree to adopt or incorporate existing commitments 
under  international  conventions  (e.g.,  the  Revised  Kyoto  Convention)  or  international 
standards (e.g., Codex Alimentarius Commission), and respect the rights and obligations 
of the parties in these international conventions in setting the FTA trade regime between 
them.   
 
If certain trade facilitation measures under an FTA have exclusivity, FTA parties have 
two choices in terms of the application of such measures: (i) extend the application of 
measures to non-members or (ii) limit the application of measures to members only. It is 
                                                  














important to note that the exclusivity of measures does not guarantee different treatment 
between members and non-members. By way of policymaking, it is possible to make the 
exclusive measures open for non-members to enjoy. When trade facilitation measures 
under an FTA are extended to non-members, such a situation is non-discriminatory. The 
same  treatment  between  members  and  non-members  can,  therefore,  be  achieved 
through policy.  
 
The  following  is  an  illustration  of  the  extension  to  non-members  of  trade  facilitation 
measures under an FTA. Preferential treatment occurs when a certain FTA member that 
initially  required  ten  documents  for  customs  clearance  from  all  of  its  trade  partners 
decides to reduce documentary requirements to five for FTA partners only. But at the 
same  time,  under  this  situation,  the  FTA  member  can  also  reduce  the  number  of 
required documents for non-members to five—the same as that for FTA partners. This 
would be the case if FTA members conducted a unilateral reform of customs procedures 
upon signing the FTA. The FTA may, therefore, bring about non-discriminatory trade 
facilitation reform.  
 
The  discriminatory  treatment  between  members  and  non-members  exists  when  FTA 
countries decide not to extend the application of measures to non-members. An actual 
reform through an FTA can be said to be discriminatory if, for example, the required 
documents for customs clearance are reduced for FTA partners only, while those for 
non-FTA members remain unchanged.  
 
2.2  Differentiated Treatment Across FTAs 
 
An FTA partner engaging in different FTAs cannot guarantee the same trade facilitation 
measures and benefits across partners in different FTAs. Trade facilitation measures 
offered  by  one  country  under  a  certain  FTA  can  be  different  from  trade  facilitation 
measures offered by the same country to another partner in another FTA. In other words, 
trade facilitation measures covered by different FTAs are not necessarily harmonized, 
even if there are common members. In some cases, trade facilitation measures covered 
by a specific FTA in which a certain country is a member could be more liberal than 
those included in another FTA in which the same country is also a member. This type of 
discriminatory  trade  facilitation  treatment  existing  across  FTAs  with  a  common  FTA 
partner is known as a differentiated trade facilitation measure.  
 
For example, a country, which requires ten documents for customs clearance against all 
trade partners, may request five documents from one FTA partner in one FTA, and may 
accept  a  single  document  from  another  partner  in  a  different  FTA.  The  possible 
explanation here is the degree of readiness and willingness of different FTA partners to 
comply with the trade facilitation measures espoused by an FTA member with multiple 
FTAs. 
 
The differentiated treatment of trade partners across FTAs is a problem intrinsic to trade 
facilitation. In tariff elimination, at least there is a fundamental objective: an FTA should 
eliminate tariffs on "substantially all" trade, as stipulated in Article XXIV of the General 
Agreement  on  Tariffs  and  Trade  (GATT).  While  there  are  issues  that  allow  different 
treatments in the field of tariffs, such as products included in a sensitive list and rules of  
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origin, the underlying objective is to abolish all tariffs among FTA members. In short, as 
far as tariff policies are concerned, an FTA is basically an all-or-nothing proposition, 
leaving  minimal  discretion  to  FTA  contracting  parties.  In  contrast,  trade  facilitation 
measures can be tailor-made to suit the contracting parties since there is no constraint 
under the WTO system on the measures that can be adopted by FTAs. The lack of a 
multilateral guideline on trade facilitation has resulted in differentiated measures across 
FTAs.  As  discussed  above,  even  FTAs  with  common  members  do  not  guarantee 
harmonized measures.  
 
 
3.  Examples of Trade Facilitation Provisions in FTAs: 
Comparing Discriminatory and Non-Discriminatory Cases 
 
There  is  no  strict  test  for  determining  whether  a  certain  trade  facilitation  provision 
contributes to or hinders the objectives of multilateralism. Non-discriminatory principles 
in trade facilitation can be expressly or implicitly superseded by more specific provisions 
in the FTA, operational guidelines between the contracting partners, or implementing 
rules and regulations of customs and other border agencies.  
 
Below is a review of trade facilitation provisions in FTAs in Asia and the Pacific. The 
review  assesses  the  discriminatory  elements  included  in  trade  facilitation  measures 
under FTAs, citing actual trade facilitation provisions.
8  
 
3.1  Transparency  
 
Transparency  provisions  in  FTAs  are,  in  general,  multilateral-friendly  since  pertinent 
information is readily made available to all interested persons. In the context of trade 
facilitation, transparency includes the availability of trade-related laws and regulations, 
establishment  of  enquiry  points,  intervals  between  publication  and  implementation  of 
trade laws and regulations, prior consultation on new or amended rules, and effective 
appeal mechanisms (ADB and ESCAP, 2009).  
 
Many  FTA  provisions  on  transparency  incorporate  an  important  principle  of  trade 
facilitation, which addresses the differing and sometimes arbitrary interpretation of laws 
by customs and border officials. The effects of those transparency provisions are usually 
non-discriminatory.  A  clear  case  of  a  non-discriminatory  transparency  measure  is 
provided in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)–Japan Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA).  
 
ASEAN–Japan CEPA, Chapter 1 General Provision, Article 4 Transparency 
1. Each Party shall, in accordance with its laws and regulations, make publicly available 
its laws, regulations, administrative procedures …   
2. Each Party shall make publicly available the names and addresses of the competent 
authorities responsible for laws, regulations, administrative procedures...  
                                                  
8   Underscoring supplied by the authors to identify and illustrate differences in trade facilitation provisions 
in FTAs.    




In other FTAs, obligations related to publication surpass what is required by the WTO. 
Making relevant trade information available on the internet is one such example. This is 
also a non-exclusive action because non-members can access the information online.  
 
Pakistan–People’s Republic of China (PRC) FTA, Chapter 3 National Treatment and 
Market Access for Goods, Article 9 Administrative Fees and Formalities 
Each Party shall make available through the Internet or a comparable computer-based 
telecommunications network a list of the fees and charges and changes thereto levied by 
the  central/federal  Government,  as  the  case  may  be,  thereof  in  connection  with 
importation or exportation.  
 
How  is  it  discriminatory?  It  should  be  noted  that  transparency  requirements  are 
sometimes included in other chapters of an FTA such as under SPS and TBT. These 
provisions usually replicate the obligations set in the SPS and TBT  agreements, and 
thus are non-discriminatory, but some WTO-plus requirements could be discriminatory.  
 
PRC–Singapore FTA, Chapter 7 TBT and SPS, Article 54  
Parties  shall  notify  each  other  through  their  respective  TBT  and  SPS  enquiry  points, 
under the TBT Agreement and the SPS Agreement, of any new technical regulation and 
SPS measure related to the trade of products in accordance with the TBT Agreement and 
the SPS Agreement, or any change to them. Each Party shall allow at least sixty (60) 
days for the other Party to present comments in writing on any notification except where 
considerations of  health, safety, environmental protection, or national security arise or 
threaten to arise to warrant more urgent action. 
 
The first half of this provision is essentially non-discriminatory because the clause only 
obliges the FTA members to notify their partners at the same time that they notify WTO 
members. However, as to the second half, the 60-day commenting period is guaranteed 
only to the FTA partner. Given that TBT Agreement Article 2.9.4 and SPS Agreement 
Annex B 5 (d) request that WTO members allow reasonable time for other members to 
make comments, the unilateral application of the 60-day commenting period seems to 
be a more liberal approach.  
 
Furthermore,  some  WTO-plus  transparency  provisions  in  TBT  and  SPS,  such  as 
participation, may be more clearly restricted to FTA members. Although the development 
of  a  country's  standards  regarding  trade  facilitation  is  closely  related  to  national 
sovereignty, outside parties can assume direct influence so long as they are granted 
national  treatment.  The  provision  of  national  treatment  in  the  Australia–United 
States (US) FTA is a good example.  
 
Australia–US FTA, Chapter 8 TBT, Article 8.7 Transparency 
1. Each Party shall allow persons of the other Party to participate in the development of 
standards, technical regulations, and conformity assessment procedures on terms no less 
favourable than those accorded to its own persons. 
 
This provision is certainly WTO-plus and contributes to a higher level of transparency, 
because parties outside the country (so long as they are geographically covered by the 
FTA) can also participate in the formulation process of standards. However, participation 
is enjoyed only by the parties to the FTA as well as non-governmental bodies in their  
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respective territories.
9 The privilege thus becomes exclusive to contracting parties of the 
FTA.    
 
3.2  Customs Procedures  
 
Despite the notion that any reform of customs procedures by one country can benefit all 
countries irrespective of the existence of an FTA, most provisions on simplification of 
customs procedures in FTAs are usually applicable to members only. Perhaps, one of 
the few examples that does not limit the application of prompt customs procedures is the 
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand (NZ) FTA.  
 
          ASEAN–Australia–NZ FTA, Chapter 4 Customs Procedures, Article 1 Objectives  
The objectives of this Chapter are to: 
a.  ensure  predictability,  consistency  and  transparency  in  the  application  of  customs 
laws and regulations of the Parties;  
b.  promote  efficient,  economical  administration  of  customs  procedures,  and  the 
expeditious clearance of goods;  
c.  simplify customs procedures; and  
d.  promote cooperation among the customs administrations of the Parties. 
 
The important point here is that this FTA does not limit the application scope of prompt 
customs procedures (cf. ASEAN-Japan CEPA below). It is critical for policymakers to 
acknowledge  that  the  fundamental  goal  of  customs  reform  is  to  expedite  customs 
procedures for all goods, not only for goods traded between FTA members.   
 
Express  shipment  refers  to  expediting  the  clearance  of  goods  through  pre-arrival 
information processing; acceptance of a single manifest or document; and submission 
thereof  through  electronic  means,  if  possible.  Express  shipment  is  critical  to  trade 
facilitation because it can significantly reduce the amount of time spent crossing a border. 
While  only  goods  traded  between  parties  can  use  express  shipment,  most  express 
shipment provisions mention the importance of the efficient clearance of all shipments. 
(This is not the case with all such provisions, however, as evident in the US–Republic of 
Korea  (Korea)  FTA  discussed  below.)  The  US–Singapore  FTA  is  a  good  example 
because it recognizes that express shipment is a second-best option. It can be said that 
the US–Singapore FTA has a better approach to express shipment from the perspective 
of non-members.   
 
US–Singapore  FTA,  Chapter  4  Customs  Administration,  Article  4.10  Express 
Shipments  
Each  Party  shall  ensure  efficient  clearance  of  all  shipments,  while  maintaining 
appropriate control and customs selection. In the event that a Party’s existing system 
does  not  ensure  efficient  clearance,  it  should  adopt  procedures  to  expedite  express 
shipments. Such procedures shall:  
(e) allow, in normal circumstances, for an express shipment to be released within six 
hours of the submission of necessary customs documentation. 
                                                  
9   Australia–US Free Trade Agreement Article 8.7, paras 1–2.   




How is it discriminatory? Most provisions on customs procedure in FTAs state that 
customs procedures should be simplified for goods traded between contracting parties, 
rather than encompassing ―all goods or shipments.‖  
 
ASEAN–Japan CEPA, Chapter 2 Trade in Goods, Article 22 Customs Procedures 
3.  For  prompt  customs  clearance  of  goods  traded  among  the  Parties,  each  Party, 
recognizing the significant role of customs authorities and the importance of customs 
procedures in promoting trade facilitation, shall endeavor to: 
(a)  simplify its customs procedures; and … 
 
When express shipment is covered by FTAs, the prescribed level of speed is applicable 
to  goods  traded  between  members  only,  and  is  thus  discriminatory.  Further, 
differentiated treatment in terms of the speed of customs clearance across FTAs can 
become an issue due to different stipulated time limitations prescribed for the different 
FTA partners of a country. Given the resources of US customs, for example, different 
time requirements across FTAs in terms of express shipment is not a large problem. 
However, for less developed countries, it is more efficient to stick to a single expedited 
amount of time to avoid maintaining several lanes—regular lanes, express lanes, super-
express lanes—which would entail additional administrative costs.    
 
US–Korea FTA, Chapter 7 Customs Administration and Trade Facilitation, Article 
7.7 Express Shipments  
Each Party shall adopt or maintain expedited customs procedures for express shipments 
while maintaining appropriate customs control and selection. These procedures shall:  
(e) under normal circumstances, provide for clearance of express shipments within four 
hours after submission of the necessary customs documents, provided the shipment has 
arrived. 
 
3.3  Exemption of Fees on Digital Products 
 
Fees are among the critical factors that affect the cost of importation and exportation. 
GATT Article VIII stipulates that all fees and charges in connection with importation and 
exportation shall be limited in amount to the approximate cost of services rendered. This 
does not constrain FTA members to introduce the concessionary fees or exemption of 
fees to FTA members. The clause providing for non-application or exemption from duties, 
fees, and other charges is an example of a trade facilitation provision with the same 
discriminatory effect as a tariff exemption.  
 
Exemption of fees is seldom applicable across the board. Fees can be waived only when 
certain goods are traded through a certain method.
10 Many FTAs stipulate that when 
digital products—computer programs, text, video, images, sound recordings, and other 
products  that  are  digitally  encoded—are  traded  via  electronic  transmission,  fees  are 
exempted.
11    
 
 
                                                  
10  For an analysis of digital products provisions in FTAs, particularly the implication for customs valuation 
and taxation, see Cannistra and Cuadros (2009).  
11  US–Singapore FTA, Chapter 14, Article 14.4.  
10          |     Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 55 
 
The question is whether or not the application of this provision is, in practice, liberal or 
restrictive. The provision is very liberal if the FTA applies fee exemption on the trade of 
digital products by electronic transmission regardless of their origin. The US–Singapore 
FTA is a good example in the sense that digital products produced outside the FTA also 
qualify for fee exemption.
12 
 
US–Singapore FTA, Chapter 14 Electronic Commerce, Article 14.3 Digital Products  
1.  A  Party  shall  not  apply  customs  duties  or  other  duties,  fees,  or  charges  on  or  in 
connection  with  the  importation  or  exportation  of  digital  products  by  electronic 
transmission.  
3.  A  Party  shall  not  accord  less  favorable  treatment  to  some  digital  products  than  it 
accords to other like digital products:  
(a) on the basis that  
(i) the digital products receiving less favorable treatment are created, produced, 
published,  stored,  transmitted,  contracted  for,  commissioned,  or  first  made 
available on commercial terms, outside its territory; or  
(ii) the author, performer, producer, developer, or distributor of such digital products 
is a person of the other Party or a non-Party, … 
4. (a) A Party shall not accord less favorable treatment to digital products created … in 
the territory of the other Party than it accords to like digital products created … in the 
territory of a non-Party.  
(b) A Party shall not accord less favorable treatment to digital products whose author … 
is a person of the other Party than it accords to like digital products whose author … is a 
person of a non-Party.  
 
How  is  it  discriminatory? While the digital product provisions in the US–Singapore 
FTA are very liberal, those contained in the Korea–Singapore FTA limit the application of 
fee  exemptions  to  digital  products  that  are  created,  produced,  published,  stored, 
transmitted, contracted for, commissioned, or first made available on commercial terms 
in the FTA partner's territory. 
 
Korea–Singapore  FTA,  Chapter  14  Electronic  Commerce,  Article  14.4  Digital 
Products 
1. Each Party shall not apply customs duties or other duties, fees, or charges on or in 
connection with the importation or exportation of a digital product of the other Party by 
electronic transmission. 
3. A Party shall not accord less favourable treatment to a digital product than it accords to 
other like digital products: 
(a) on the basis that: 
(i)  the  digital  product  receiving  less  favourable  treatment  is  created,  produced, 
published,  stored,  transmitted,  contracted  for,  commissioned,  or  first  made 
available on commercial terms in the territory of the other Party; or 
(ii) the author, performer, producer, developer, or distributor of such digital product 





                                                  
12  Singapore–Australia FTA Chapter 14, Article 3 and Korea–Singapore FTA Article 14.4 have similar 
provisions.    




3.4  Origin Administration for Preferential Tariff Treatment 
 
Origin  administration  provisions  in  FTAs  are  meant  to  ease  the  procedure  for 
establishing  the  origin  of  goods.  Establishing  the  origin  of  the  goods  in  question  is 
necessary for claims of preferential tariff treatment. This is precisely the reason why 
origin provisions are usually enjoyed only by FTA partners. However, the degree of ease 
in  obtaining a  certificate  of  origin  for  claims  of  preferential tariff  varies  across  FTAs. 
Therefore, the issue here is differentiated treatment across FTAs. 
 
In  some  FTAs,  a  certificate  of  origin  shall  be  issued  by  government  authorities 
(e.g., under  the  ASEAN–PRC  FTA).  A  more  liberal  approach  to  the  issuance  of  a 
certificate of origin would be to allow relevant parties designated by the government, 
such as associations, to issue the certificate (e.g., under the ASEAN–Japan CEPA).  
 
Framework  Agreement  on  ASEAN–PRC  FTA,  Annex  3  Rules  of  Origin  for  the 
ASEAN–PRC FTA, Attachment A  
Rule 1: The Certificate of Origin shall be issued by the Government authorities of the 
exporting Party.  
 
ASEAN–Japan CEPA, Annex 4 Operational Certification Procedures 
Rule 2: Issuance of Certificate of Origin  
1. The competent governmental authority of the exporting Party shall, upon request made 
in writing by the exporter or its authorized agent, issue a CO or, under the authorization 
given in accordance with the applicable laws and regulations of the exporting Party, may 
designate other entities or bodies (hereinafter referred to as ―designees‖) to issue a CO. 
 
A ―self certificate‖ is the most liberal approach to establishing origin. Self-certification, or 
certification that emanates from the traders as a means of application for preferential 
treatment,  is  certainly  less  burdensome  than  an  application  for  a  certificate  of  origin 
emanating from government authorities. A certificate can usually be issued by importers, 
but under some FTAs, exporters can also issue them.   
 
ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA), Annex 8 Operational Certification Procedure for 
the Rules of Origin under Chapter 3, Rule 5 Application for Certificate of Origin 
At the time of carrying out the formalities for exporting the products under preferential 
treatment, the exporter or his authorized representative shall submit a written application 
for the Certificate of Origin (Form D) together with appropriate supporting documents 
proving that the products to be exported qualify for the issuance of a Certificate of Origin 
(Form D).  
 
Malaysia–NZ FTA, Annex 3 Procedures and Verifications, Article 1 Declaration of 
Origin  
1. A claim that goods are eligible for preferential tariff treatment shall be supported by a 
declaration as to the origin of a good from the exporter or producer. 
 
US–Singapore FTA, Chapter 3 Rules of Origin, Article 3.13: Claims for Preferential 
Treatment  
1. Each Party shall provide that an importer may make a claim for preferential treatment 
under  this  Agreement  based  on  the  importer’s  knowledge  or  on  information  in  the 
importer’s possession that the good qualifies as an originating good.  
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Further, other FTAs waive the application for the certificate of origin for any consignment 
of goods below the defined customs value, ranging from a ceiling of US$200 to over 
US$2,000  free  on  board  (FOB).  The  varying  thresholds  for  a  certificate  of  origin 
exemption  in  FTAs  can  also  be  discriminatory  between  partners  of  a  country  with 
multiple FTAs.
13 Under AFTA, for example, if the export value (FOB) does not exceed 
US$200, Form D ( certificate of origin for claims of preferential treatment) is waived. 
Instead  of  Form  D,  a  simplified  declaration  by  the  exporter  that  the  goods  have 
originated in the exporting member state will be accepted.  
 
AFTA  Common  Effective  Preferential  Tariff  (CEPT),  Annex 8  Operational 
Certification Procedure for the Rules of Origin under Chapter 3, Rule 15 Waiver of 
Certificate of Origin 
In the case of consignments of goods originating in the exporting Member State and not 
exceeding US$200 FOB, the production of Certificate of Origin (Form D) shall be waived 
and the use of simplified declaration by the exporter that the goods in question have 
originated in the exporting Member State will be accepted. Goods sent through the post 
not exceeding US$200 FOB shall also be similarly treated.  
 
Japan–Singapore EPA, Article 29 Claim for Preferential Tariff Treatment 
1. … the importing Party shall not require a certificate of origin form importers for:  
(a) an importation of a consignment of a good whose aggregate customs value does not 
exceed JPY200,000 or its equivalent amount.
14   
 
3.5  Conformity Assessment of Standards 
 
SPS and TBT are at the core of behind-the-border issues in a broader definition of trade 
facilitation.  In  view  of  this,  some  FTAs  try  to  achieve  the  harmonization  of  product 
standards and/or mutual recognition
15 of each other's standards, despite the  inherent 
difficulty.
16 Alternatively,  some  FTAs  provide  for  mutual  recognition  of  conformity 
assessment of standards, which is relatively easier than mutual recognition of standards 
and thus has great potential for trade facilitation.  
 
ASEAN member countries signed a framework on mutual recognition arrangements 





 ASEAN MRAs require 
                                                  
13  Under  US$200  FOB  for  AFTA,  ASEAN–PRC  FTA,  ASEAN–Japan  CEPA;  under  US$600  FOB  for 
PRC–Singapore FTA and PRC–Chile FTA; and under US$1,000 FOB for Japan–Mexico FTA, Japan–
Malaysia EPA, and Korea–Singapore FTA. 
14  JPY200,000 is equivalent to US$2350 (US$1 is roughly JPY85 as of June 2010).  
15  Mutual recognition arraignments (MRAs) are arrangements between two or more parties to mutually 
recognize or accept some or all aspects of one another’s conformity assessment results (e.g., test 
reports and certificates of compliance). 
16  Under the Singapore–Australia  FTA,  ―a  Party  shall  accept  a  food  standard  of  the  other  Party  as 
equivalent even if the standard differs from its own… [if such] achieves the purposes of the importing 
Party’s food standard‖ (Food Sectoral Annex 3.1.1).  
17  ASEAN sectoral MRAs for Electrical and Electronic Equipment (EEE), signed in April  2002, and for 
ASEAN Harmonized Electronic Equipment Regulatory Scheme, signed in December 2005.  
18  To date, MRAs have been entered into between Singapore and Indonesia, Singapore and Brunei, and   




parties to accept the test reports and certifications issued by the testing laboratories and 
certification bodies of the other parties.
20 This reduces, if not eliminates, duplicate testing 
and certification requirements in all ASEAN territories.
21  
 
Furthermore,  the  MRA  on  electrical  and  electronic  equipment  (EEE)  provides  an 
extremely liberal approach to conformance assessment. ASEAN does not preclude the 
possibility that the conformity assessment  might be  conducted outside ASEAN (unlike 
other FTAs, such as US–Australia).  
 
ASEAN Harmonized Conformity Assessment Procedures for EEE, Appendix C 
1.2. Test Reports and/or Certificates of Conformity issued by Conformity Assessment 
Bodies located outside ASEAN in compliance with the requirements of this Agreement 
may be accepted provided that ASEAN enters into a Mutual Recognition Agreement with 
the country or countries where the said Conformity Assessment Bodies are situated.  
 
How  is  it  discriminatory?  Specific  conformity  assessment  provisions  can  also  be 
territorial in nature and hence exclusive to FTA members. This includes the national 
treatment in conformity assessment bodies as in the case of the US–Australia FTA, and 
unlike the case of AFTA mentioned above.   
 
Australia–US FTA, Chapter 8 TBT, Article 8.6 Conformity Assessment Procedures 
3.  Each  Party  shall  accredit,  approve,  license,  or  otherwise  recognise  conformity 
assessment bodies in the territory of the other Party on terms no less favourable than 
those it accords to conformity assessment bodies in its territory…    
 
Japan's Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) with Singapore, the Philippines, and 
Thailand  feature  a  case  of  differentiated  treatment  of  conformity  assessment  bodies 
across different FTA partners. It can be argued that the first EPA is more liberal than the 
latter two. The Japan–Singapore EPA allows the designation of conformity assessment 
bodies (CABs) by the host country and registration with the other party. This means that 
both Singapore and Japan only need to register under this agreement the CABs that 
each  of  their  designating  authorities  assigned  to  issue  certificates  of  conformity.  In 
contrast,  the  Japan–Philippines  EPA  and  Japan–Thailand  EPA  require  that  CABs 
issuing certificates of conformity assessments in the Philippines and Thailand must be 
accredited by the Japanese government.  
 
Japan–Singapore  EPA,  Chapter  6  Mutual  Recognition,  Article  46  General 
Obligations
22 
Each party shall accept, in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, the results of 
conformity  assessment  procedures  required  by  the  applicable  laws,  regulations  and 
                                                                                                                                                
Singapore and Malaysia.  
19  ASEAN Harmonized Cosmetic Regulatory Scheme, signed in September 2003.  
20  ASEAN EEE MRA Article 3, para 1.   
21  The implementation of the MRAs, however, has yet to be extended to ASEAN’s external partners in 
ASEAN plus FTAs.  
22  Singapore–Korea FTA has the same provision (Article 8.5.3). Article 53 (Registration of Conformity 
Assessment Bodies) of Japan–Singapore FTA stipulates the actual procedures of registration.  
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administrative provisions of that Party specified in the relevant Sectoral Annex, including 
certificates  and  marks  of  conformity,  that  are  conducted  by  the  registered  conformity 
assessment bodies of the other Party.   
 
Japan–Philippines  EPA,  Chapter  6  Mutual  Recognition,  Article  60  General 
Obligations
23 
Each Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Chapter, permit participation of 
conformity  assessment  bodies  of  the  other  Party,  in  the  system  of  the  former  Party 
providing  for  conformity  assessment  procedures  and  shall  accept  the  results  of 
conformity  assessment  procedures  required  by  its  applicable  laws,  regulations  and 
administrative provisions specified in the relevant Sectoral Annex, including certificates of 
conformity, that are conducted by the conformity assessment bodies of the other Party 
registered by the Registering Authority of the former Party. 
 
The Japan–Singapore EPA’s MRA has wider coverage than the Japan–Philippines EPA. 
Under the former, the mutual recognition of conformity assessments includes electrical 
products,  telecommunications  terminal  equipment,  and  radio  equipment  (Annex  III, 
Sectoral Annex), while under the later two EPAs, the mutual recognition covers only 
electrical products (Annex 4 of each EPA).  
 
 
4.  Policy Recommendations: Minimizing Negative Effects of 
Trade Facilitation under FTAs 
 
An FTA aims principally to promote international trade by eliminating tariffs between or 
among  its  members.  By  nature,  an  FTA  offers  preferential  tariff  treatment  to  FTA 
members only. Therefore, whether an FTA is a building block or stumbling block to a 
multilateral trading system is a critical question for trade economists (Bhagwati, 1995).
24  
 
Similarly, trade facilitation measures can be enjoyed, in most cases, by FTA members 
only. These measures have negative effects on non -members just as tariff elimination 
has  a  negative  effect  (e.g.,  trade  diversion).  Although  the  relat ionship  between 
regionalism and multilateralism in the field of trade facilitation merits equal attention to 
that in tariff elimination, the systemic problem regarding trade facilitation seems to have 
been overlooked by both policymakers and international  trade theorists. While GATT 
Article XXIV sets three conditions
25 for tariff elimination among FTA members, there is 
no equivalent guideline in the field of trade facilitation.  
 
                                                  
23  Japan–Thailand EPA has a similar provision (Chapter 6 Article 62).  
24  Proponents, while recognizing FTAs as being second-best to multilateralism, argue that FTAs generate 
large trade creation effects. Critics of regionalism through FTAs focus on the significant trade diversion 
effects and caution that FTAs could lead to a decline in global welfare. The building block vs. stumbling 
block debate on trade liberalization remains. 
25  Three conditions stipulated in GATT Article XXIV are: (i) substantially all the trade should be covered by 
the FTA (GATT XXIV-8), (ii) the FTA should be formed within a reasonable time frame (GATT XXIV -
5c), and (iii) trade barriers against non -FTA members should not be higher or more restrictive than 
those prior to the formation of the FTA (GATT XXIV-5a).  




It is critical for policymakers to consider the impact on non-members of trade facilitation 
measures  under  FTAs,  particularly  measures  that  may  have  discriminatory  elements 
against non-members. The best scenario is to multilateralize or extend the application of 
trade  facilitation  measures  under  the  FTA  to  all  non-members.  If  there  is  a  need  to 
implement trade facilitation measures that can be enjoyed only by FTA partners, then 
the second-best policy is to minimize the negative effects against non-FTA members. At 
the same time, differentiated treatment—in terms of trade facilitation measures across 
FTAs with common partners—should also be considered. Therefore, it is important that 
negotiators  and  policymakers  consider  the  three  questions  or  issues  listed  below  in 
designing trade facilitation measures in FTAs.  
 
Can  trade  facilitation  measures  under  an  FTA  be  multilateralized?  When  FTA 
members introduce trade facilitation measures that can be enjoyed only by partners, it is 
important to justify such measures. For example, as we have seen, when an FTA allows 
parties of member countries to participate in the formulation process of new standards 
with a national treatment status, it is critical to carefully examine why such a treatment 
cannot be granted to parties of non-member countries. Likewise, when an FTA allows 
CABs in an FTA partner's territory to conduct a conformity assessment test, it is critical 
to  consider  why  a  test  conducted  by  CABs  outside  the  FTA  territory  would  not  be 
acceptable.  In  short,  FTA  countries  should  make  every  effort  to  multilateralize  or 
implement the same trade facilitation measures across all countries. Listed below are 
illustrative examples of multilateralizing trade facilitation measures originally targeted at 
FTA partners.   
 
(i)  When FTA members allow parties of FTA member countries to participate 
in the standards formulation process, the members must consider why 
parties in non-member countries cannot get involved in the process.  
 
(ii)  When FTA members reduce the number of required documents for FTA 
partners, the members must consider why it may be impossible to apply 
the same measures to non-FTA partners.  
 
(iii)  When FTA members introduce concessional fees to FTA partners, the 
members must consider why the same fees cannot be made applicable to 
non-FTA partners.  
 
(iv)  When  FTA  members  agree  with  the  mutual  recognition  of  conformity 
assessment,  the  members  should  consider  why  the  testing  laboratory 
should be located in the territory of FTA members.    
 
Does  the  treatment  of  non-FTA  partners  become  worse-off?  When  an  FTA 
introduces trade facilitation measures that can be enjoyed only by FTA partners, the 
treatment  of  non-FTA  members  must  not  be  made  worse  when  compared  with  the 
treatment they received before the introduction of the trade facilitation measures. One of 
the three conditions for FTAs stipulated under GATT Article XXIV for goods integration—
trade  barriers  to  non-members  should  not  be  reinforced  when  FTAs  are  introduced 
(GATT XXIV-5)—can be a helpful guideline in minimizing the negative effects of trade 
facilitation measures under FTAs. Some express shipment provisions introduced in this  
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paper, which state that the first priority is to expedite the clearance of all shipment and 
that express shipment is second best, are good examples of minimizing the negative 
effects of trade facilitation measures under FTAs.  
 
(i)  When FTA members decide to make trade rules and regulations available 
via  a  website,  the  members  should  ensure  that  the  paper-based 
information is not made less efficient as a result. Paper-based information 
is  critical  for  traders  without  internet  access,  especially  in  the  least 
developed countries.   
 
(ii)  When  FTA  members  introduce  the  express  shipment  system  for  FTA 
partners, this should not lead to longer customs clearance times at the 
lane used by non-FTA partners. 
 
(iii)  When FTA members introduce automated customs clearance systems, 
the existing paper clearance system for other countries (particularly least 
developed countries) that are unable to introduce an electronic system 
should, as much as possible, remain efficient or be made as efficient as 
the electronic system. If the paper-based system becomes less efficient 
because  resources  are  reallocated  to  the  electronic  system,  then  this 
effectively creates higher barriers to trade for non-members.  
 
Is it possible to introduce  an MFN clause in trade facilitation provisions under 
FTAs? When a country has FTAs with various countries, it is important to consider the 
consistency of trade facilitation measures included in each FTA. If one country renders 
differentiated  trade  facilitation  treatment  across  various  FTA  partners,  this  may 
sometimes  cause  confusion.  The  distinction  of  goods  from  FTA-partner  and  non-
partners seems to be more straightforward than the situation in which a country has 
different rules for each FTA partner.   
 
(i)  When a country with multiple FTAs introduces express shipment, it may 
be advisable to have one express shipment lane for all FTA partners. For 
example, having a regular lane (for non-FTA partners), express lane (for 
certain FTA partners), and a super-express lane (for other FTA partners) 
makes the overall process complicated and inefficient.  
 
(ii)  When  FTA  members  accept  self  certificate  under  a  certain  FTA,  but 
require a certificate issued by government authorities under another FTA, 
origin  administration  may  become  complicated  from  a  business 
perspective.  Different  threshold  values  for  the  exemption  of  submitting 
certificates across FTAs may also be confusing for traders.  
 
To  a  considerable  degree,  the  problem  resulting  from  differentiated  trade  facilitation 
treatment  measures  across  FTAs  with  common  partners  can  be  solved  through  the 
introduction of automatic MFN status in terms of trade facilitation. In fact, some FTAs 
provide  for  automatic  MFN  wherein  a  party  is  obliged  to  extend  to  its  existing  FTA 
partners any future trade liberalization or facilitation measures offered to WTO members, 
as well as preferential treatment accorded to future FTA partners. Using tariff rates as an  




example, in cases where the agreed FTA rate is higher than the MFN rate, the MFN rate 
is automatically adopted in the FTA. The automatic MFN clause is also adopted in trade 
facilitation  where  the  parties  state  that  if  they  agree  to  use  certain  trade  facilitation 
principles or mechanisms with any non-party or future FTA partner, such as a back-to-
back  certificate  of  origin  or  third  party  invoicing,  then  these  principles  should  be 
automatically incorporated in the FTA.  
 
India–Singapore CECA
26 Annex I 
The Parties confirm…that in the event that India adopts and implements the usage and 
concepts of De Minimis and Outward Processing in any bilateral, regional, or global trade 
agreement with any third party  or  parties, India shall adopt and implement the same 
usage and concepts…for the Agreement. 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
Are  trade  facilitation  measures  under  FTAs  discriminatory?  This  study  tackled  the 
question  by  providing  detailed  empirical  analysis  on  whether  or  not  trade  facilitation 
provisions in FTAs are exclusive to contracting FTA partners, and how the measures 
can be discriminatory against non-members. This study also analyzed the implications of 
differentiated trade facilitation treatment across various FTAs. The analysis found that 
despite  the  multilateral  scope  and  non-discriminatory  objectives  of  trade  facilitation 
measures, some trade facilitation measures under FTAs may actually be discriminatory, 
with the same impact as preferential tariff elimination.  
 
In  summary,  designers  of  trade  facilitation  provisions  in  FTAs  need  to  consider  (i) 
whether  or  not  discriminatory  trade  facilitation  treatment  between  FTA  members  and 
non-members is necessary, and (ii) how to avoid or minimize any negative impacts on 
non-members  of  introducing  trade  facilitation  measures  under  FTAs.  Furthermore, 
applying the same trade facilitation treatment across various FTA partners, rather than 
different  treatment  for  different  FTA  partners,  significantly  contributes  to  easing  the 













                                                  
26  Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement.   
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